

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USUN N 06079 01 OF 03 240047Z

73

ACTION IO-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-06 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-01

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R 232348Z DEC 74

FM USMISSION USUN NEWYORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8627

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USUN 6079

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, CH

SUBJ: CHINA IN THE 29TH UNGA

SUMMARY: CHINA PASSED THROUGH THE 29TH GA WITHOUT LEAVING MUCH OF A MARK. ITS PERFORMANCE WAS ERRATIC, SOMETIME LOW VISIBILITY, SOMETIMES NOISILY OFFENSIVE, VIRTUALLY ALWAYS INTRANSIGENT, AND ITS DELEGATION HERE FREQUENTLY SEEMED SIMPLY OUT OF TOUCH. CHINA DID NOTHING TO CHANGE THE 29TH UNGA FOR THE BETTER, AND ITS INFLUENCE WAS LIMITED IN MAKING IT WORSE. THE PRC, WE BELIEVE, IS ONLY AT THE BEGINNING STAGES OF CONCEPTUALIZING THE UN'S ROLE IN CHINESE POLICY, AND IT IS SHORT OF EXPERT CADRE. BUT THE CHINESE PRESENCE AMPLY ADDED TO OUR TROUBLES ON KOREA AND KHMER, AND PROMISES TO INTENSIFY OUR PROBLEMS ON THESE (AND THE PRG) ISSUES, AT THE SAME TIME, THE CHINESE ARE NOT PARTICIPATING IN UN-SPONSORED MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC BODIES NOR ARE THEY STRENGTHENING THE UN'S ROLE IN MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY.

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PAGE 02 USUN N 06079 01 OF 03 240047Z

THEY PROVIDED NO HELP ON MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS. IN TERMS OF US

INTERESTS IN THE UN, THE CHINESE CONTRIBUTION TO THE 29TH
GA WAS NEGATIVE BUT FAR FROM DECISIVE. END SUMMARY.

1. IN HEARING OTHER DELEGATIONS' IMPRESSIONS OF CHINA'S
IMPACT ON ITS THIRD COMPLETE UNGA, AND IN TAKING A COMMITTEE
BY COMMITTEE LOOK AT ITS PERFORMANCE OURSELVES, WE ARE STRUCK
BY THE COMMON DIFFICULTY OF CHARACTERIZING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
CHINESE PARTICIPATION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THE CHINESE
DELEGATION THE FALL FULFILLED THE CONVENTIONAL-WISDOM
EXPECTATIONS THAT IT WOULD CONTINUE TO USE THE UN AS A MEDIUM
TO ATTACK THE SOVIET UNION AND TO PROMOTE ITS INTERESTS
WITH THE THIRD WORLD. CHINESE RHETORIC TO THESE ENDS RANG
TEDIOUSLY THROUGH THE PLENARY AND ITS MAIN COMMITTEES,
AND RIGHTS OF REPLY TO THE SOVIETS, IN ADDITION TO
ATTACKS IN SCHEDULED STATEMENTS, WERE EXERCISED WITH REGULARITY.
WITH THE PRINCIPLE EXCEPTION OF THE FIFTH (FINANCIAL)
COMMITTEE, WHERE THE CHINESE DELEGATE SEEMED TO HAVE A RELATIVELY
FREE REIN AND TOOK NOTABLY (FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW)
CONSTRUCTIVE AND NON-IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONS, THE PRC
DELEGATION OFTEN SEEMED NOT REALLY INTEGRATED WITH THE WORK
OF THE UNGA, ACTED AND REACTED OFTEN WITH LITTLE FEEL FOR
CONTEXT.

2. WE SIMILARLY FIND IT DIFFICULT TO JUDGE HOW THE
CHINESE THEMSELVES ARE ASSESSING THE 29TH UNGA. CHINA CO-
SPONSORED ONLY FIVE RESOLUTIONS -- CAMBODIA, KOREA,
ADMISSION OF TWO NEW MEMBERS, AND PALESTINE -- BUT STUCK
ITS OWN NECK OUT ONLY ON TWO OF THEM, KOREA AND KHMER.
ON KOREA, CHINA TOOK A NOMINAL DEFEAT, BUT RETAINED ITS
CREDENTIALS WITH PYONGYANG AND POSITIONED ITSELF WELL FOR
NEXT YEAR'S BATTLE. CHINA WAS SOLIDLY BUT NARROWLY DEFEATED
ON THE ONE ISSUE -- THE SEATING OF SIHANOUK -- TO WHICH ITS
PRESTIGE WAS FULLY COMMITTED.

3. ON THIS ISSUE, THE CHINSE DELEGATION -- STARTING WITH
CHIAO KUAN-HUA'S GENERAL DEBATE STATEMENT, RUNNING THROUGH
THE GENERAL COMMITTEE AND PLENARY ON THE REPRESENTATION
RESOLUTION, THEN THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE AND PLENARY ON
THE CREDENTIALS ISSUE -- WENT OUT OF ITS WAY TO SINGLE
OUT THE S FOR ATTACK; IN FACT, THE CHINESE DID THEIR BEST TO
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PAGE 03 USUN N 06079 01 OF 03 240047Z

MAKE THE CAMBODIA QUESTION INTO AN ANTI-US QUESTION. THE
CHINESE ALSO DID SO, BUT TO A SOMEWHAT LESSER EXTENT, ON
THE KOREA ITEM. HOWEVER, ITS RHETORIC ON KOREA WAS MUCH LESS
GRATUITIOUSLY NASTY, AND THIS ISSUE DREW LESS OF THE UNGA'S
ATTENTION. (THEY GAVE OCCASIONAL SUPPORT TO THE PRG IN DEBATE,
AND HAVE BEEN ACTIVE WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL BEHIND
THE SCENES TO ENHANCE THE PRG'S STATUS.)

4. IF PEKING'S ANALYSTS ARE GIVEN TO TAKING A SERIOUS LOOK AT THE CHINESE ROLE IN THE 29TH GA, THEY CANNOT HELP BUT BE SOMEWHAT RUEFUL OVER THE FACT THAT THE TWO ITEMS WITH WHICH THE CHINESE WERE MOST CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WERE JUST THOSE TWO IN WHICH THE AFRO-ARAB BLOCK, THE "NON-ALIGNED" TO WHOM THE CHINESE GAVE SUCH RHOETRICAL SUPPORT, FAILED TO DISPLAY DRAMATIC SOLIDARITY.

5. ELSEWHERE IN THE GA, THE CHINESE SEEMED TO TAKE MOST SERIOUSLY THE FIRST COMMITTEE'S ACTIONS ON DISARMAMENT. HERE, HOWEVER, THEIR POSITIONS WERE LARGELY DEFENSIVE AND BY NO MEANS SUCCESSFUL. THEY TOOK PREDICTABLY STRONG POSITIONS, AND REMAINED IN THE MINORITY, ON NON-PROLIFERATION AND TEST BAN RESOLUTIONS. ALTHOUGH THEY FELT OBLIGED TO ACQUIESCE IN YET ANOTHER SOVIET-SUPPORTED WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE RESOLUTION, THEY (AND WE) CAN TAKE SOME SATISFACTION THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WAS PREVENTED FROM MOVING FURTHER TOWARD AGREEING THAT THERE WILL BE SUCH A CONFERENCE. CHIAO'S OPENING GENEERAL DEBATE STATEMENT EXHIBITED UNCERTAINTY ABOUT HOW TO HANDLE THE SOVIET ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION PROPOSAL, AND, IN THE END, CHINA WAS OBLIGED TO BOW TO OVERWHELMING GA SUPPORT FOR THE SOVIET INITIATIVE. THEIR DEBATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE INDIAN OCEAN PEACE ZONE PROPOSAL, WHICH THEY COSPONSORED ONLY UNDER PRESSURE, WAS UNSURPRISINGLY CRITICAL OF SUPERPOWER (PARTICULARLY SOVIET) ABUSES IN THE AREA AND BROKE NO NEW GROUND.

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PAGE 01 USUN N 06079 02 OF 03 240115Z

73

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 USUN 6079

6. THE CHINESE, AS A MATTER OF ROUTINE, GAVE NOISY SUPPORT TO THE MEXICAN CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES, BUT THEY ONLY SHOWED INTIMATE INTEREST IN THAT PROPOSAL IN THEIR INSISTENCE THAT TWO PARAGRAPHS WERE "IRRATIONAL" BECAUSE, IN EFFECT, THEY REFLECTED SOVIET INPUT. (THEIR THIR OBJECTION WAS TO THE USE OF THE WORD "INTERDEPENDENCE", TO WHICH THEY ALSO HAD DEVOGES SUBSTANTIAL ATTENTION AT THE SPECIAL SESSION EARLIER IN THE YEAR. ON THE OTHER HAND WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION THEY SPOKE LESS OF "SELF-RELIANCE" AT THIS GA, PRESUMBALY HAVING LEARNED THIS TO BE AN UNPOPULAR CONCEPT.)

7. ON OTHER ECONOMIC QUESTIONS, THE CHINESE UNIFORMLY SUPPORTED THIRD-WORLD INITIATIVES AND DEMANDS THAT THE INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS MAKE WAY FOR A MORE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF GLOBAL WEALTH. DISAPPOINTINGLY, THE CHINESE DID NOT TAKE UP THE OPPORTUNITY TO BECOME A MEMBER OF THE WORLD FOOD COUNCIL. DOING SO WOULD HAVE BEEN A SIGNAL
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PAGE 02 USUN N 06079 02 OF 03 240115Z

THAT THE PRC IS READY TO UNDERTAKE SUBSTANTIAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN AN AREA OF UN ECONOMIC/HUMANITARIAN ACITIVITY OF CONCERN TO ALL MEMBER STATES.

8. THEIR PERFORMANCE IN THE LEGAL COMMITTEE WAS OFTEN INEPT AND THEIR STATEMENTS, ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, WERE DELIVERED OUT OF CONTEXT AND VERY EVIDENTLY ON RIGID ADHERENCE TO INSTRUCTION. THEY ROUTINELY SUPPORTED CHARTER REVIEW, BUT OTHERS, WE THINK, CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THEY WERE ABLE CYNICALLY TO DO SO BECAUSE SOVIET AND US OPPOSITION MADE THIS ENTIRELY SAFE. A TENDENCY TO DELIVER STATEMENTS, SLOGANS STRUNG TOGETHER WITHOUT MUCH LOGIC OR RELEVANCE TO THE ISSUE AT HAND, WAS EVIDENT ALSO IN THE THIRD (HUMAN RIGHTS) COMMITTEE. HERE THEY WERE REPRESENTED BY A MISSION COUNSELOR WHO IN PAST YEARS HAS SERVED VARIOUSLY AS THE MISSION'S ADMINISTRATIVE AND SECURITY OFFICER AND REPRESENTATIVE ON THE FINANCIAL COMMITTEE, IN THIS COMMITTEE, ALTHOUGH A WOMAN DELEGATE SPOKE ON THE INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S YEAR ITEM, THE CHINESE DID NOT ATTEMPT SERIOUSLY TO EXPLOIT CHINESE ACHIEVEMENT ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN.

9. IN THE CONTEXT OF SOME COMMITTEES, CHINESE DELGATES

DID SEEM TO BE MORE ACTIVE IN CORRIDOR CONTACT, BUT WE HAVE FOUND NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY EXPLOITED THESE OPPORTUNITIES WITH REAL SUCCESS. THE CHINESE DELEGATIONS'S FOREIGN LANGUAGE CAPABILITY SEEMS TO EXCEED THAT OF THE SOVIETS, BUT, AS FAR AS WE ARE ABLE TO PERCEIVE, THIRD WORLD DELGATES HAVE FOUND THE CHINESE SHORT ON THE INFORMAL, PERSONAL FOLLOW-UPS TO WHICH AFRICAN AND LATIN AMERICAN DELEGATES IN PARTICULAR PUT SO MUCH STOCK. WE HAVE SELDOM HEARD A CHINESE DIPLOMAT HERE SPEAK WARMLY OF THE UN OR HIS SERVICE IN NEW YORK, AND THIS ATTITUDE MAY WELL ENCUMBER EFFECTIVENESS WITH FOREIGN COLLEAGUES. THE DELEGATION'S CLOISTERED OFFICE/ RESIDENCE LOCATED FAR AWAY ON THE WEST SIDE ADDS TO THEIR PROBLEMS BY RENDERING INFORMAL PERSONAL CONTACT CUMBERSOME, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE CHINESE TYPICALLY COME AND GO IN GROUPS AND SELDOM ENTERTAIN OUTSIDE THEIR MISSION.

10. THE CHINESE TYPE SEEMS STILL TO PUZZLE MANY HERE. THEY RESERVE THEIR LOBBYING ENERGY PRINCIPALLY TO ENSURE MAXIMUM OPPOSITION TO THE SOVIETS, EVEN ON THE SIHANOUK ITEM,
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PAGE 03 USUN N 06079 02 OF 03 240115Z

WE FOUND A SURPRISING LACK OF EVIDENCE OF CHINESE LOBBYING HERE (ALTHOUGH THEY WERE PROMINENT IN PROMOTING A WALK-OUT WHEN THE KHMER PRIME MINISTER SPOKE). THEY RELIED INSTEAD, APPARENTLY, ON STATE VISITS TO PEKING (E.G., NEPAL, NIGERIA, ZAIRE) AND OTHER ACTIONS OUTSIDE OF NEW YORK TO OBTAIN SUPPORT. IN NEW YORK, CHINESE FAILURE TO CONSULT FULLY WITH THEIR PRINCIPAL ALLY ON THE CAMBODIA QUESTION, SENEGAL PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE FALL, RESULTED IN EMBARRASSING CONFUSION OVER THE FORMULATION OF THE LANGUAGE DESIGNED TO DEPRIVE THE GKR DELEGATION OF ITS CREDENTIALS. EVEN THE UNRELENTINGLY PASSIONATE SIHANOUK BOOSTER AMBASSADOR FALL COMPLAINED OF CHINESE INTRANSIGENCE ON THE ISSUE.

11. ONE CHINESE EFFORT IN THE ASIAN GROUP (REPRESENTATIVES FROM SYRIA THROUGH JAPAN) IMPRESSED MANY ASIANS AS DISPLAYING INFLEXIBILITY AND A GRATUITOUSLY-OFFENSIVE STYPEL. VIRTUALLY ALL MEMBERS OF THIS GROUP HAD ACKNOWLEDGED LAST YEAR MONGOLIA'S RIGHT TO A COMMITTEE CHIARMANSHIP THIS YEAR. THE CHINESE, HOWEVER, FOUGHT TO THE END THIS MONGOLIAN CANDIDACY, BRINGING UP CLEARLY SPURIOUS ARGUMENTS AGAINST ITS SELECTION AND OFFENDING MOST OTHERS IN THE PROCESS. IN THE END, THEY HAD TO SWALLOW THIS MONGOLIAN PILL TOO.

12. THROUGH THE GA, THE CHINESE CONTINUED TO USE THE "NON-PARTICIPATION" OPTION, PARTICULARLY ON PEACEKEEPING MATTERS, BUT ALSO ON SUCH DISPARATE OTHER ISSUES AS DISARMAMENT, SPANISH SAHARA AND OUR "MISSING IN ACTION" RESOLUTION. CHINESE "NON-PARTICIPATION" WAS MOST STRIKING IN

THE TWO QUESTIONS THAT MOST SERIOUSLY THREATENED INTERNATIONAL PEACE:
THE MIDDLE EAST AND CYPRUS. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY SO IN THE
SECURITY COUNCIL, WHERE THE CHINESE RESPONSE TO EVERY CHALLENGE
WAS TO REPEAT CHINESE PEACEKEEPING DOCTRINE AND/OR
ATTACK SUPERPOWER HEGEMONY. IN THE GA PALESTINE DEBATE, CHINA
VIGOROUSLY SUPPORTED EVERY ARAB INITIATIVE, BUT IN NO
CASE ATTEMPTED TO INFLUENCE THE DRAFTING OF RESOLUTIONS OR
THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES.

13. THE CHINESE TOOK LESS INTEREST THIS YEAR, WE FEEL, IN
MAINTAINING FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH OUR DELEGATION. THEY
DID NOT PROPOSE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS BEFORE THE GENERAL
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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 USUN N 06079 02 OF 03 240115Z

ASSEMBLY, THEY TENDED TO PROVIDE LOWER LEVEL REPRESENTATION
AT US-SPONSORED FUNCTIONS, AND, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THEIR
FREE WHEELING FIFTH COMMITTEE REPRESENTATIVE AND THEIR ACTION
OFFICER ON DISARMAMENT, DID NOT SEEM TO GO OUT OF THE WAY TO
CULTIVATE US COMPARED TO PAST YEARS.

14. WHAT CONCLUSIONS, HOWEVER, LIMITED, CAN WE DRAW
FROM THIS?

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PAGE 01 USUN N 06079 03 OF 03 240131Z

73

ACTION IO-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-06 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-01

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 USUN 6079

15. THE CHINESE HAVE JUST ABOUT COMPLETED THE CHIREP BATTLE, HAVING ALL BUT OBLITERATED TAIWAN FROM THE UN CONSCIOUSNESS (WITH THE STUBBORN EXCEPTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS), NOW THAT THIS CHORE IS VIRTUALLY DONE, THEY SEEM TO HAVE LOST A MAJOR ENERGIZER FOR FOCUSSED ACTION.

16. WE TENTATIVELY INFER THAT THE CHINESE STILL HAVE NOT FIGURED OUT HOW THEY SHOULD USE THE UN AS AN INSTITUTION, NOR DO THEY HAVE THE CADRE QUALIFIED TO DO SO. WHEN THEIR FIRST DELEGATION ARRIVED HERE IN 1971, THEIR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POSTURE WAS THAT THEY HAD MUCH TO LEARN, HAD AN INSUFFICIENT NUMBER OF EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL, AND THEREFORE THEY WERE LIMITED IN THEIR ABILITY TO PARTICIPATE.

17. THEY HAVE LEARNED MUCH IN THEIR THREE YEARS HERE ABOUT THE WORKINGS OF THE UN, BUT THEY OBVIOUSLY STILL HAVE FAR TO GO. ASSIGNMENT OF THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER TO THE THIRD
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PAGE 02 USUN N 06079 03 OF 03 240131Z

COMMITTEE MIGHT BE CONSTRUED TO SYMBOLIZE DISDAIN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS FUNCTIONS OF THE UN, BUT WE SUPPOSE THAT THIS CURIOUS MIXTURE SYMBOLIZES, INSTEAD, A SHORTAGE OF EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL, FURTHERMORE, IF THEIR LACK IS EVIDENT HERE, IT MAY BE EVEN MORE CHARACTERISTIC OF THEIR BACKSTOPPING IN PEKING. HENCE, INSTRUCTIONS ARE ISSUED TO THE UN DELEGATION WITH LITTLE REAL UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WILL BE THE CONTEXT OF THEIR IMPLEMENTATION IN NEW YORK. PEKING PRESUMABLY DEVOTES MORE EXCLUSIVE ATTENTION, EVEN COMPARED WITH WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW, TO HOW POSITIONS TAKEN AND STATEMENTS MADE HERE WILL BE EXPLOITED IN BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS AND BY PRC MEDIA TARGETTED OUTSIDE NEW YORK.

18. ON MIDDLE EAST QUESTION, PEKING'S IDEOLOGICAL RESISTANCE TO PEACEKEEPING OBLIGES THE CHINESE TO STICK TO THE "NON-PARTICIPATION" FORMULA AS A COP-OUT FROM THE VOTING REALITIES HERE. THEY WANT TO SUPPORT THE ARAB STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION AGAINST WHAT THEY SEE AS THE ISRAELI-SOVIET-AMERICAN COMPLEX OF IMPERIALIST OPPRESSORS. BUT ALL PARTIES ALSO WANT "PEACE", AND SINCE OPPOSING "PEACE" WOULD SITANCE CHINA FROM THE THIRD WORLD, THE DELGATION MAKES CAREUL STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD AND ESCHEWS VOTING.

THUS, THE CHINESE ARE STOPPED FROM DAMAGING INITIATIVES
AND ARE HANDICAPPED IN EXPOITING AN ISSUE WHICH HAS MAJOR
SIGNIFICANCE BEYOND THE UN.

19. ON NARROWER ISSUES, IT SEEMS TO US THAT, FAR MORE THAN THE US
AND THE USSR, THE PRC HAS FAILED SO FAR TO CONCEPTUALIZE
HOW THE UN AS AN INSTITUTION CAN MOST PROFITABLY BE
INGTEGRATED, WITHOUT DAMAGE, INTO OVERALL PRC FOREIGN POLICY,
THE SOVIETS, HANDICAPPED ALSO BY DOGMA, NEVERTHELESS
HAVE HAD THIRTY YEARS EXPERIENCE IN COPING WITH THE UN.
THEY AGGRESSIVELY, THROUGH "INITIATIVES" SUCH AS THE PROPOSAL
FOR STRNGTHENING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, WORLD DISARMAMENT
CONFERENCE, REDUCTION OF BUDGETS, PUT THE INSTITUTION TO
WORK ON SUBSTANCE, HOWEVER, SPURIOUS, ON MOSCOW'S BEHALF.
THE DAY MAY COME WHEN THE CHINESE WILL USE IMAGINATION TO
SUCH UN-ORIENTED ENDS ALSO, BUT THERE IS NO SIGN THAT THIS
TIME IS ABOUT TO ARRIVE.

20. IN THE MEANTIME, WHILE THE CHINESE KNEE-JERK OPPOSITION
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PAGE 03 USUN N 06079 03 OF 03 240131Z

TO THE SOVIETS HERE PROVIDES A HANDY COUNTERPOINT TO OUR
EFFORTS, IT IS SHALLOW AND NOT, IN OUR JUDGMENT, PARTICULARLY
EFFECTIVE.

21. OF GREATER RELEVANCE IS THE SERIOUSLY TROUBLESOME
CHINESE PRESSURE ON SUCH ISSUES AS CAMBODIA AND KOREA,
AND (ALTHOUGH MOSTLY THROUGH THE SECRETARY GENERAL
AND OUTSIDE THE GA FRAMEWORK) IN ENHANCING THE INTERNATIONAL
STATUS OF THE PRG.

22. THE CHINESE, HOWEVER DISDAINFUL IN PROVIDE ABOUT OTHERS'
LONGWINDED RHETORIC AND THE POINTLESSNESS OF MANY RESOLUTIONS,
ACTUALLY LEND THEIR SUPPORT TO THE TENDENCIES OF THE UN THAT
WE FIND MOST DISTURBING. AT THE SAME TIME, THEIR REPRESENTATION
HERE HAS NOT SUCCEEDED IN BRINGING THE PRC PRODUCTIVELY EITHER
INTO THE UN'S MEANINGFUL MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES ON
WHICH WE PUT SUCH EMPHASIS, OR INTO CONSTRUCTIVE UNGA OR
SECURITY COUNCIL ACTIONS RELATED TO MAINTENANCE OF PEACE
AND SECURITY.
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